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Abstract 
 
The effectiveness of environmental regulation can be viewed as conditioned by the 
action of at least two main agents: the regulated firms and the public agency (the 
regulator). The agency’s role is, on one hand, to enact environmental regulations and, 
on the other, to monitor firms’ environmental behavior and enforce environmental 
regulations. The regulated firms, on the other hand, must be informed about the legal 
limits imposed on them and subsequently they must be able to comply with those limits. 
Using a questionnaire on the pulp and paper industry in Portugal we found that firms 
decision to comply with environmental regulations is strongly influenced by firms’ 
information on its legal obligations and that this effect is stronger for smaller firms. 
Moreover larger and younger firms are less likely to comply with environmental 
regulations than smaller and older firms. With respect to the public agency’s behavior, 
we found that greater monitoring efforts are directed towards larger and younger firms, 
as well as towards those firms most likely to cause higher pollution levels. 
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1. Introduction 
Compliance with environmental regulations is a major issue in most countries 
since imposing a limit on firms’ emissions does not secure a decrease in its emissions. 
For the objective of the environmental policy agency to be accomplished it is necessary 
that firms’ behavior be monitored and the legal limits enforced. In addition, firms must 
be informed about the limits they are required to meet and must be able to comply with 
those limits. 
Winter and May (2001) identified five sets of determinants for firms’ decision to 
comply with environmental regulations: calculated motivations, normative motivations, 
social motivations, awareness of rules, and capacity to comply. The determinants 
depend on the firms, the community and the public agency responsible for creating the 
regulations, monitoring firms’ performance and enforcing the regulations. 
One precondition for firms’ compliance with environmental regulations is firms’ 
knowledge of the environmental regulations they must comply with. Winter and May 
(2001) found that firms’ awareness of environmental regulations plays a crucial role on 
firms’ environmental compliance.  
Social motivations for compliance may also be present. Specifically, public 
disclosure of information on the degree of compliance with the environmental standards 
by firms may put additional pressure on firms to comply with environmental 
regulations. Afsah et al. (2000) found that public disclosure of information in Indonesia 
has induced a decrease in polluting emissions namely because it increases managers’ 
information about their own plant’s pollution and abatement opportunities. However 
this effect is stronger if public disclosure programs are implemented in conjunction with 
external effects such as effects on certification and on stock prices. 
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In sum, two issues related to information are essential for environmental 
compliance. On the one hand firms must be well informed about the environmental 
regulations they must comply with, and, on the other hand, public disclosure of 
information about firms’ environmental performance may raise firms’ perceived social 
duty to comply.1 
Firms’ decision to comply with environmental regulation also depends on the 
behavior of the public agency that monitors and inspects firms’ compliance. In other 
words, the decision to comply is also influenced by the enforcement and monitoring 
strategy of public agencies. These strategies influence the expected costs and benefits of 
compliance.2 In particular, firms’ expected costs and benefits of compliance are 
influenced by the likelihood of detection, the likelihood and amount of the fine and the 
cost of compliance. Winter and May (2001) found that the higher the probability of 
detection the higher the degree of compliance by firms; compliance is also greater if 
regulated firms think there is a stronger likelihood of a fine being imposed for a given 
violation. 
With respect to the public agency’s behaviour, Dion et al. (1997) found that 
monitoring is not random. Using plant-level data from the pulp and paper industry in 
Quebec, Dion et al. (1997) found that larger firms and firms whose activity may cause 
higher environmental damages have a higher probability of being inspected. The latter 
result lends support to the theoretical work on monitoring issues which, in general, 
predicts that monitoring activities occur more frequently at major sources of pollution 
                                                          
1 This motivation for compliance is also designated as normative commitment by Burby and Paterson 
(1993). 
2 Winter and May (2001) designate the decision to comply by comparison of expected costs and benefits 
of compliance as ‘calculated motivation’ for compliance. 
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and at firms where the public agency believes that environmental requirements are 
being violated.3 
Empirical research into these issues is, however, relatively little mainly due to 
data limitations. In this paper we propose to evaluate the extent of compliance by 
Portuguese firms in the Pulp and Paper industry with current air legislation and analyze 
possible determinants of firms’ compliance behavior with a particular emphasis on 
firms’ information about their legal obligations. We found that this is an important 
problem in the Pulp and Paper Industry in Portugal. Therefore it is important to improve 
the information channels on environmental legislation towards the firms. Additionally 
we investigate the determinants of the agency’s decision to monitor and inspect 
polluting firms. The data used was collected by a national survey of Portuguese firms in 
the Pulp and Paper industry conducted in June 1999. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a summary of Portuguese 
legislation on air pollution with special emphasis on the issues relating to the Paper and 
Pulp Industry. Section 3 presents the survey instrument elaborated to investigate the 
information firms have on the environmental regulations applicable to them, the degree 
of compliance with those regulations, and the agency’s behavior with respect to 
inspections. Section 4 contains the characterization of compliant versus noncompliant 
firms and informed versus non-informed firms and tests for the role of information on 
firms’ decision to comply with regulations. Section 4 also contains the analysis of the 
determinants of agency’s behavior regarding its decision to inspect firms. Concluding 
remarks are offered in Section 5. 
                                                          
3 Russel et al. (1986) and Cohen (1999) provide excellent surveys of the literature on monitoring issues. 
One common feature of this literature is the assumption that the probability of inspection depends on the 
relation between the firms’ effective pollution and allowed pollution. More recently, formal game 
theoretic work on these issues has focused on providing a rationale for this assumption by explicitly 
modelling the strategic incentives of the parties (firms and inspection agencies) involved in such settings 
(see, for example, Franckx (2001a, 2001b)). 
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2. Institutional Background 
Portuguese environmental regulation’s fundamental text was published in April 
1987. Under article 8, all activities that release harmful emissions to the environment 
are subject to special regulation. In particular, polluting activities are subject to a 
licensing process and their emissions are subject to limits established in specific 
legislation. Moreover, if the legal limits on emissions are not met, state agencies may 
apply fines and sanctions. One possible sanction is to cease the activity, and in some 
cases judicial actions may also be taken. 
The control of polluting emissions from fixed sources is defined in a separate 
legal text (Dec. Lei 352/90, November 1990). Plants that generate emissions subject to 
legal limits4 must self-control their emissions. The control is either continuous or 
periodical,5 and the state agency may perform monitoring activities whenever it finds it 
adequate.6 The legal limits7 are set according to three criteria: existence of adequate 
control technology, economic effects on the plants, the well-being of the population and 
of the environment. Non-compliance with the obligations and limits set in the present 
legal text are subject to fines.8 The law also establishes that all negligent behavior is 
punishable. Finally, article 30º creates an environmental tax on pollutants. The objective 
                                                          
4 The classification of the activities subject to limits on the release of polluting emissions and the limits 
for each type of pollutant is established in Portaria 286/93, March 12. The pollutants controlled by this 
text are sulphur dioxide, lead, particles, ozone, and carbon monoxide. 
5 The definition of the type of control of emissions that plants must perform is set according to criteria 
defined by European Union regulations, or if these do not exist it should be defined by the state agency at 
the time of the licensing process. 
6 The state agency must install control stations of air quality in areas where pollution is expected to be 
high, and that are representative of the local conditions. If the information on emissions reveals 
concentration levels above the limit concentration level of pollutants, the state agency may declare the 
area as exceptional, which implies the definition of a plan to reduce emissions and its information to local 
plants and general population accompanied by a financial plan to help cope with the new levels. This 
specific legal text confirms the bias of environmental state agencies towards the control of polluting 
emissions in areas where environmental damage is expected to be high. This bias was also found in 
enforcement activities by Dion et al. (1998). 
7 The limits may be revised at least every five years, except if the European Union regulations change. 
8 The limits of the fines are set in the general legislation. 
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of the tax consists in raising revenues for air pollution control initiatives9 and is a 
function of the amount of emissions in the previous year. 
 
3. The Survey 
The Paper and Pulp Industry is an important source of air pollution from fixed 
sources. It is also a sector composed of plants of different sizes located in several 
districts. As such, this sector constitutes a good case study that might enable us to make 
important inferences for other polluting sectors as well. 
The survey is composed of two parts.10 The first part consists on questions 
regarding a general characterization of the firm. Some questions are on the date of birth, 
location, subsector of activity,11 sales revenues, number of workers, percentage of 
foreign capital, etc. The second part is on the evaluation of the degree of information 
firms have about the legislation that covers their activity. Some of the questions under 
evaluation are the licensing process, the environmental impact study, the knowledge of 
the level of risk that was attributed to the firm as a function of the activity developed, 
and the risk that the activity implies to humans and the natural environment. We also 
question firms on their agreement/disagreement with some pieces of environmental 
legislation. Finally, questions on specific aspects of the legislation are included. These 
aspects are emissions’ limits, measurement of emissions and means of emissions release 
(chimneys). The survey was mailed to all firms in the Paper and Pulp Industry in 
Portugal excluding firms with less than 5 paid workers, and answers where also 
received by mail.12 
                                                          
9 The tax may be used to finance plants’ investments in pollution abatement. 
10 The survey is available from the corresponding author upon request.  
11 The Paper and Pulp industry is divided into four subsectors: Pulp Mills (21110); Paper and Paperboard 
Mills, except corrugated (21120); Paper and Paperboard Mills, including boxes (21211); Other Paper and 
Paperboard boxes (21212). 
12 A self addressed stamped envelope was sent together with the survey.  
 6
 
4. Results 
A brief characterization of the firms in the sample13 is depicted in Figure 1. 
Firms are distributed by 9 districts with a higher concentration in Aveiro, Lisbon, and 
Porto. Half of the firms are in subsectors 21120 and 21212. With respect to size of the 
firms, 44% of the firms have more than 50 workers (29.4% have more than 100), and 
44% of the firms have sales revenues higher than 750 000 000 PTE.14 Most firms were 
created after 1960, and 18% were born after 1990. Finally, 58.8% of the firms are 
located in an industrial park, but 20.6% are located in residential areas. 
 
(Figure 1 about here) 
 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of firms classified in four types according to the 
information firms have and their compliance with environmental regulations. We 
conclude that informed firms comply more with environmental regulation than 
uninformed firms (34.3% compared with 11.4%). In addition, the percentage of 
informed firms is higher within the group of compliant firms than within the group of 
noncompliant firms. 
 
(Figure 2 about here) 
 
 
                                                          
13 Concerns about the representativeness of the sample led us to perform some statistical tests (binomial, 
and zM tests – see, for example, Conover (1980)) since only 34 of the 173 surveys mailed were returned 
complete. We tested the representativeness of the sample with respect to four variables on which we had 
information for the sample and the population. The variables were: district of location, subsector of 
activity, number of workers and sales revenue. We concluded that our sample was representative with 
respect to district of location, number of workers and sales revenue. This analysis is available from the 
corresponding author upon request. Although the results indicate that the sample is representative, there is 
also the question about whether the firms that returned the survey are, in some other aspects, different 
from the ones that did not respond, but we have no means to evaluate this hypothesis. 
14 750 000 000 PTE is approximately 3 750 000 Euro. 
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To evaluate in more detail firms’ information about the environmental 
legislation applicable to this sector of activity, and the degree of compliance with that 
legislation, we selected only some of these requirements given the large number of legal 
dispositions. In particular we examine whether firms creation was preceded by an 
environmental impact study (EIS). We found that among the firms created after 1990 
that were required to have had an EIS only 16.7% were complying with the legislation 
in this respect. However, among the firms that received a monitoring team (53% of all 
firms) 28% had an EIS. 
With respect to polluting emissions, we found that the number of firms that 
release substances above a specific level established in the regulation and consequently 
should control emissions continuously but do not do it varies between 62% and 75%. 
However, all firms that had not been visited by a monitoring team were not complying 
with the legislation in this respect. Among monitored firms, approximately 50% were in 
compliance. 
Finally, firms were questioned about the characteristics of their chimneys. We 
found that approximately two thirds of the firms had chimneys with the required height, 
but only 50% were complying with other requirements for the chimneys. Monitored 
firms did not differ from non-monitored firms in this respect. 
However, monitored firms are in some other aspects different from non-
monitored firms. In particular, the incidence of agency inspections is higher in larger 
firms.15 About 70% of the firms with more than 100 workers had been inspected, and 
64% of the firms with sales revenues higher than 1 000 000 PTE had also been 
inspected. The incidence of agency inspections is also higher in firms whose activities 
                                                          
15 The terms used to describe types of compliance inspections are not standardized in the literature. Here 
we use the terms “monitored firm” or “inspected firm” interchangeably to mean that the firm has been 
subject to a monitoring visit where agency staff conduct measurements to determine concentrations and 
rates of discharge of pollutants. 
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generate high levels of risk for humans and the environment. About 73% of the firms 
that had been classified by the state agency as presenting a high risk activity had been 
inspected, while only 44% of the firms presenting low or no risk activity had been 
inspected. 
Table 1 presents probit estimates of the effects of these two variables (size of the 
firm as measured by the number of workers in the firm, and level of risk) on the 
probability of a firm being inspected, while controlling as well by the age of the firm. 
The latter variable is measured by a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm 
was born after 1990, and the value of 0 otherwise. Since many pieces of the Portuguese 
environmental regulations in the Paper and Pulp industry apply only to firms created 
after 1990 (e.g. the requirement to have an environmental impact study), one could 
expect a concentration of monitoring activities on these firms and, as a consequence, a 
positive effect of this variable on the probability of an inspection. 
 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
 
The results suggest that younger firms and high risk firms are more likely to be 
inspected than older and low risk firms, but the effects of these variables are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels of significance (below the 0.1 significance 
level). A statistically significant determinant of the probability of inspection is the size 
of the firm. The results show that, all else the same, large firms are more likely to be 
inspected by the state agency than small firms. 
Characterizing non-compliant firms we found that most firms not in compliance 
with the legislation or not correctly informed belong to the Paper and Paperboard Mills, 
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except corrugated (21120), are located in Lisbon, have sales revenues above 1 000 000 
PTE, and hire more than 100 workers.16 Moreover, 23% of the firms ignore the purpose 
of the environmental tax which is, namely, to finance investments that reduce the 
release of polluting emissions. However, with respect to the specification of the 
emissions’ release equipment, 50% of the firms have the adequate equipment with 
correct specifications and measurement process. The other half, either do not have the 
equipment, ignore the amount of emissions that release, or ignore the limits on 
emissions set by specific legislation. This finding emphasizes the need to improve the 
information to firms on their legal obligations as a precondition for enforcement. 
Table 2 presents probit estimates for the determinants of firms’ compliance with 
the applicable environmental legislation.17 The independent variables considered are the 
information status of the firm (a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if informed, and 
the value of 0 otherwise), the risk level of the firm’s activity, a dummy variable 
indicating whether the firm was created after 1990, the size of the firm, as well as an 
interaction variable formed by interacting the size of the firm with the information 
status of the firm. 
 
(Table 2 about here) 
 
                                                          
16 The finding that noncompliant and/or misinformed firms are primarily located in Lisbon is somewhat 
surprising given that Lisbon is the wealthier district of the ones analyzed.  Moreover, these firms are large 
firms with respect to number of workers and sales revenues. We would expected that larger firms and 
firms located in wealthier areas would be better informed since public pressure is expected to be stronger 
in this type of communities as suggested by Pargal et al.(1997). 
17 As noted previously, the present study is limited by the data set used. First, participation in the study 
was voluntary and, consequently, it is possible that firms that did not return the survey have 
distinguishing characteristics from those that did return it. However, it seems reasonable to assume that 
those participating in the study were the ones more likely to care about the issue under analysis. In 
addition, we are assuming that participating firms answered truthfully to the questions posed in the 
survey. Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume that if anything firms would underreport noncompliance. 
So, in a sense, our results might overestimate compliance by Portuguese firms in the paper and pulp 
industry. 
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Inspection of Table 2 reveals that firms created after 1990 are less likely to be in 
compliance with the environmental legislation than older firms, an effect that is both 
statistically significant and quantitatively large. The results also suggest that high risk 
firms are less likely to comply with the environmental legislation than low risk firms, 
but the effect is not statistically significant. Very important to our analysis is the effect 
of information on firms’ compliance with the legislation. The results in Table 2 show 
that informed firms have a higher probability of compliance than uninformed firms. 
This effect is statistically significant and the magnitude of the estimate reveals the 
importance of being informed. This result is extremely important for policy since it 
suggests that increasing the number of informed firms significantly increases the 
probability of compliance with environmental regulations. The effect of information on 
the probability of compliance, however, varies with the size of the firm. In particular, 
the regression results suggest that information about environmental obligations 
decreases the probability of compliance for larger firms. These results, however, suffer 
from the assumed monotonicity in the relationship between compliance behavior and 
size. The importance of the small, intermediate and large firms in the general probit 
result obtained might vary however considerably. 
In order to best evaluate the effect of the interaction between the information 
status of the firm and its size on the probability of compliance, we generated predicted 
values for the probability of compliance according to the information status of the firms. 
To do so, we first estimated separate probit models for the sub-samples of informed and 
uninformed firms using the same set of independent variables as the ones used in the 
regression shown in Table 2 excluding the variables pertaining to the firms’ information 
status (results not shown18). We then classified the firms into three size classes, namely 
firms with less than (or equal to) 25 workers, firms with between 26 and 50 workers, 
                                                          
18 These results are available from the corresponding author upon request. 
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and firms with more than 50 workers. Finally, for each size class, we predicted the 
probability that each firm would comply with the environmental legislation based on 
that firm’s characteristics and the compliance behavior of the informed firms. Next we 
averaged these predicted probabilities across all informed firms for each size class.19 
Thus for each size class we formed the average probability that the informed firms in 
our sample would comply with the environmental legislation. We repeated an identical 
prediction procedure using the estimated coefficient vector from the uninformed firms 
to predict the average probability that the uninformed firms would comply with the 
applicable environmental legislation. The results of these predictions are reported in 
Table 3. 
(Table 3 about here) 
 
The results show that uninformed medium-size firms have a higher probability 
of compliance than uninformed small firms, but a lower probability of compliance than 
their large size counterparts. However, tests on the equality of these predicted 
probabilities across the size classes of uninformed firms reveals that they are not 
statistically different at conventional levels of significance, a result that accords with the 
regression results reported in Table 2.20 Also in accordance with the regression results 
in Table 2, we find that the larger the size of informed firms, the lower is the probability 
of their compliance with the applicable environmental regulations. However, tests on 
the equality of these predicted probabilities across the size classes of informed firms 
                                                          
19 There are two methods to generate predictions from a dichotomous choice model such as the probit. 
The first is to evaluate the index function using the characteristics of each firm, and then evaluate the 
probability of compliance for that firm. These probabilities can then be averaged over the sample. The 
second method is to use the same initial procedure, but use the predicted individual probability of 
compliance to assign the firm as being either a compliant firm or a non-compliant firm depending on 
whether the predicted probability exceeds ½. These predicted dichotomous observations can then be 
averaged over the sample. We prefer to use the first method as it retains more information than the second 
method. 
20 The tests of the null hypothesis that the predicted probability of compliance for small uninformed firms 
is less than the predicted probability of compliance for medium-size and large uninformed firms yielded a 
test statistic z=-0.42 (p-value=0.34) and z=-0.19 (p-value=0.42), respectively. The test of the null 
hypothesis that the predicted probability of compliance for medium-size uninformed firms is higher than 
that for large uninformed firms yielded a test statistic z=0.30 (p-value=0.38). 
 12
reveals that the probabilities of compliance of small and medium-size informed firms 
are not statistically different. The probability of compliance of large informed firms is 
significantly lower than the probability of compliance of both small and medium-size 
informed firms.21 Thus, the effect of firms’ size on the probability of compliance differs 
according to the information status of the firms. Specifically, the size of the firm has no 
significant effect on the probability of compliance of uninformed firms. On the other 
hand, the size of the firm is a significant predictor of the probability of compliance of 
informed firms. There is, however, non-monotonicity in the relationship between 
compliance behavior and size of informed firms. In particular, the probability of 
compliance of large informed firms is significantly lower than the probability of 
compliance of small and medium-size informed firms. 
The results in Table 3 also show that the impact of information on the 
probability of compliance varies with the size of the firm. Specifically, information 
about the applicable environmental regulations increases the probability of compliance 
of small and medium-size firms. The probability of compliance of large firms is, on the 
other hand, negatively affected by information. Formal statistical tests were conducted 
to determine the statistical significance of these apparent differences in compliance 
behavior. These are reported at the bottom of Table 3. The results show that the effect of 
information on the probability of compliance is statistically significant only for small 
firms. The probability of compliance of large and medium-size firms is not statistically 
different between informed and uninformed firms. In sum, we find that the effect of 
information on compliance is larger and statistically significant for smaller firms. Thus 
government’ efforts to increase compliance should concentrate on providing 
                                                          
21 The tests of the null hypothesis that the predicted probability of compliance for small informed firms is 
higher than the predicted probability of compliance for medium-size and large informed firms yielded a 
test statistic z=0.64 (p-value=0.26) and z=2.21 (p-value=0.01), respectively. The test of the null 
hypothesis that the predicted probability of compliance for medium-size informed firms is higher than 
that for large informed firms yielded a test statistic z=1.40 (p-value=0.08). 
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information to firms about the regulation and that effort is especially fruitful in smaller 
firms. 
 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
One of the most pressing problems the international community faces today is 
the degradation of the natural environment. Decision makers and planners at all levels 
of government face an increasing pressure from the public to protect the environment. 
Generally speaking, one of the major devices that society has at its disposal for 
implementing environmental protection is regulation, monitoring and enforcement. 
Securing compliance with pollution regulations, however, is not an easy task. First, 
many regulatory schemes may not be properly designed or, even if properly designed, 
may not be implemented effectively. Secondly, even when environmental agencies 
make enforcement efforts, firms may find ways around requirements and the outcomes 
may be different than those anticipated by the regulator. The monitoring and 
enforcement behavior of environmental agencies, as well as the compliance behavior of 
firms have been the subject of extensive theoretical work, with substantial contributions 
from scholars in political science, public policy and economics, but they are still not 
well understood empirically. The reason is that, mainly due to data limitations or data 
unavailability, empirical research on these issues lags woefully behind theoretical 
research. In an attempt to broadening our understanding of these issues, this paper uses 
data from the Portuguese pulp and paper industry to analyse the environmental 
agencies’ behavior with respect to the monitoring of environmental requirements and 
the firms’ decision to comply with those requirements. 
Four main sets of findings emerge from our analysis. First, and in line with the 
findings of Dion et al. (1997), the results provide moderate evidence that greater 
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inspection efforts are allocated towards those firms whose activities may cause higher 
environmental damage and towards younger firms where environmental requirements 
are more likely to be violated given the stronger requirements applicable to these firms. 
These results provide empirical support to the assumption in most theoretical work on 
monitoring issues that the probability of inspection depends on the relation between the 
firms’ effective pollution and allowed pollution. In addition, these results also lend 
support to the public interest theory of regulation (Posner (1974)) that views the purpose 
of regulation, including environmental regulation, as the enhancement of social welfare 
via improved efficiency in resource allocation, and considers that the public agencies 
faithfully pursue the implied allocative objectives. The empirical results also provide 
compelling evidence that, all else the same, larger plants face a higher probability of 
being inspected. This result is in line with Dion et al. (1997)’s finding that the greater 
the “visibility” (measured by the importance of the firm in the labor market) of the firm, 
the larger the number of inspection actions it faces. 
Second, the results indicate that, ceteris paribus, younger firms and firms whose 
activities are more likely to cause environmental damage are less likely to be in 
compliance with the applicable environmental regulations. This result might seem 
somewhat surprising given that these are exactly the firms that are more likely to be 
subject to inspection actions. However, as noted previously, firms’ decision to comply 
with environmental regulations depends not only on the likelihood of a violation being 
detected and the penalties associated with non-compliance, but also on the probability 
that penalties will be imposed. If polluters do not expect environmental agencies to have 
the political clout and resources needed to enforce regulations, they have little (if any at 
all) incentive to undertake any costs of compliance, and this is even more so where 
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these costs are high as they are in high risk firms and younger firms with stronger 
environmental requirements. 
The third set of findings emerging from our analysis concerns the role of 
information and size on firms’ compliance behavior. The data for the Portuguese pulp 
and paper industry show that there is a considerable degree of misinformation with 
respect to firms’ own emissions and environmental regulations. In particular, many 
firms ignored the amount of emissions they release, the type of measurement they are 
mandated to do, and the purpose of the environmental tax. The last point is particularly 
important since the investments firms do in emissions’ abatement are deductible from 
the tax. So it is in their best interest to invest in this area. The results of our multivariate 
analysis also show that the effect of information on firms’ probability of compliance is 
strong and statistically significant. For small firms, the probability of compliance goes 
from 33% if they lack information about the environmental regulations to 82% if they 
do have information. This indicates that one important way to improve environmental 
compliance by firms is to increase firms’ knowledge of environmental regulation. Afsah 
et al. (2000) found that one of the advantages of the public disclosure information 
program in Indonesia, pointed by firms, was to improve firms’ information on their 
emissions and abatement opportunities. This suggests that an effective way to improve 
firms’ information might be including in the Portuguese regulations the requirement of 
publicly disclosing information about firms’ environmental performance. 
Finally, our results reveal that large informed firms are less likely to comply 
with environmental regulations than smaller informed firms. The identified combination 
of a positive effect of firms’ size on the probability of inspection and this negative effect 
of size on the probability of compliance suggests that environmental agencies may be 
monitoring larger firms for visibility of their actions, but avoiding enforcing 
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environmental regulations for these larger firms. In a sense, this agrees with the notion 
that firms employing more workers may (knowingly) benefit from some leniency in 
enforcement of penalties because regulators may be reluctant to take decisions that risk 
the jobs of many workers (Field (1997)). To a degree, this result also lends some 
support to the economic theory of regulation (Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976)) that 
would view public agencies as allocating monitoring resources in a way that maximizes 
political support. In line with this view, the public agency may obtain political support 
from the environmentally concerned community by undertaking “visible” inspection 
actions and, simultaneously, obtain political support (or, at least, not loosing it) from 
those that benefit from the existence of large firms by engaging into less enforcement 
actions with respect to these firms (Dion et at. (1997)). Thus, our results suggest that, 
rather than substitutes, the public interest and the economic theories of regulation 
should be viewed as complementary in explaining the agencies’ decision to inspect 
firms. Moreover, in addition to informational issues, our overall results suggest that 
enforcement is probably the weakest link in the environmental protection chain in the 
Portuguese pulp and paper industry. 
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Figure 1: Sample characteristics 
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Figure 2: Distribution of firms according to compliance and information status (relative 
frequencies ) 
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Table 1 – Probit estimates for determinants of monotoring by the state agency 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic p-Value 
Intercept -1.277 0.646 -1.98 0.048 
Risk 0.693 0.532   1.30 0.193 
Year>90 0.282 0.581   0.49 0.627 
Workers 0.332 0.174   1.90 0.057 
     
Log-likelihood -20.358   
χ2_statistic (p-Value) 7.50 (0.057)   
Percent correct 64.71   
Sample size 34   
 
 
Table 2 – Probit estimates for determinants of compliance 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic p-Value 
Intercept 1.139 1.480   0.77 0.442 
Informed 1.906 1.021   1.87 0.062 
Workers 0.006 0.011   0.58 0.561 
Informed×Workers -0.027 0.016 -1.76 0.079 
Risk -0.404 0.292 -1.38 0.167 
Year>90 -1.226 0.652 -1.88 0.060 
     
Log-likelihood -18.072   
χ2_statistic (p-Value) 8.83 (0.116)   
Percent correct 76.47   
Sample size 34   
 
 
Table 3 – Predicted compliance probability according to the firms’ size and information       
status 
                           Number of Workers 
 ≤ 25 [26-50] > 50 
Not Informed 0.327 0.517 0.394 
Informed 0.816 0.658 0.265 
 H0: diff < 0 
z = -1.551 
P < z =  0.060 
H0: diff < 0  
z = -0.347 
P < z =  0.364 
H0: diff > 0 
z =  0.487 
P > z =  0.313 
 
 
 
